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Overview of European State-Sanctioned Mass Surveillance Law 
 Introduction  
 Privacy rights have come to the fore of European law with the passing of the General 
Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’).1 While the GDPR is largely meant to address the 
protection of individuals’ data in a business context, it is also applicable to actions taken by 
Member State governments; however, Article 23(1) creates a derogation from the regulation’s 
requirements for legislation aimed at ensuring national and public security. 2 This paper provides 
an overview of the case law from the primary European Union (‘EU’) courts, the European Court 
of Justice (‘CJEU’) and the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’), and considers data 
protection rights in the context of surveillance programs aimed at crime prevention and national 
security. Given that the issues which may arise are likely to be similar, this overview is meant to 
shed light on how the courts might address the Article 23 derogation were it to arise in future 
cases.  
 The two courts have handled cases relatively similarly, and often refer to one another’s 
case law; in doing so, they have discussed overlapping requirements for surveillance programs 
such as strict necessity for purposes of the relevant security interest, verifiable individualized 
suspicion relating to the surveillance target, and prior surveillance authorization by an 
independent entity. However, slight discrepancies have begun to emerge, and with the 2018 Case 
                                                 
1 See for example: Dillet, Roman, “French data protection watchdog fines Google $57 million under the GDPR,” 
TechChruch, 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/21/french-data-protection-watchdog-fines-google-57-million-
under-the-gdpr/  
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88, art. 23 [hereinafter, General Data Protection Regulation], 
https://gdpr-info.eu/  
of Big Brother Watch and Others v. United Kingdom, it appears that the ECHR may be accepting 
something more like a standard wherein the court considers generally whether it is satisfied that 
the surveillance program contains sufficient safeguards to protect against arbitrariness and abuse. 
This paper also considers possible reasons for why the two courts might treat this issue 
differently, such as the nature of the respective underlying rights-providing documents they 
interpret, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘Charter’) and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘Convention’). Finally, the paper ends by analyzing implications 
that can be drawn for the future and ongoing cases.  
GDPR Article 23(1)  
Article 23(1) of the GDPR outlines conditions in which it would be permissible for a 
Member State to pass domestic legislation that restricts the scope of GDPR rights protections. 
Specifically, the derogation is operative if the legislation “is a necessary and proportionate 
measure in a democratic society to safeguard: (a) national security; (b) defence; (c) public 
security.”3 
To explore how European courts might deal with any litigation arising on the basis of this 
derogation, it is helpful to look to existing law dealing with mass state surveillance programs in 
privacy rights cases. The relevant case law deals with similar terminology and subject matter as 
is provided in Article 23(1), and may be particularly illustrative given the growth of mass 
surveillance programs run by Western European governments for security and crime-prevention 
purposes.4 To be clear, it does not seem Article 23 will be applied to existing mass surveillance 
programs themselves insofar as Article 2(2) implies the GDPR is inoperative to instances of data 
                                                 
3 Ibid 
4 Lubin, Asaf, “A New Era of Mass Surveillance is Emerging Across Europe,” Just Security, Jan. 9, 2017, 
https://www.justsecurity.org/36098/era-mass-surveillance-emerging-europe/  
processing relating to State-sponsored defense and security measures.5 Indeed, the ECHR 
determined that the GDPR did not apply, on the basis of the Article 2(2) security exception, in 
the Case of Centrum For Rattvisa v. Sweden.6 Under this view, Article 23(1) may be strictly 
viewed as applying to legislation.  
Regardless of any ambiguity with respect to the GDPR’s applicability to domestic 
national security laws, understanding how the courts engage with the relevant terms and issues 
could provide clues with respect to any sort of litigation that might arise in relation to Article 
23(1). Thus, the following provides a consideration of the evolving body of case law in the CJEU 
and the ECHR wherein the courts work to determine the contours of the privacy rights found in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter7 and Article 8 of the Convention,8 respectively. Given that the 
CJEU has jurisdiction to interpret European Union law, it has the final say on GDPR matters. 
But, as the text of the GDPR indicates, any restrictions in the rights that it outlines ought be 
consistent with the Convention, which is interpreted by the ECHR.9 Furthermore, there is 
significant dialogue between the courts on relevant issues in their opinions; thus, exploring this 
interaction will be informative.  
European Court of Justice Case Law 
 Digital Rights Ireland – April 2014 
                                                 
5 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 2(2) 
6 Case of Centrum For Rattvisa v. Sweden, no. 35252/08, European Court of Human Rights, 19 June 2018, sec. 81, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-183863  
7 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407, art. 7 [hereinafter 
Charter of Rights]. 
8 European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, art. 8, 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf  
9 General Data Protection Regulation, recital 73 
The CJEU has been generally reluctant to give Member States free reign in the name of 
national security or other crime-prevention measures.10 Relevant here is the court’s ruling in 
Digital Rights Ireland and Others in which a watchdog organization challenged Ireland’s 
legislatively-mandated data retention program. Recognizing the data privacy rights found in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, the court held that the Irish data retention program as well as an 
EU-wide data retention program (Directive 2006/24) were invalid. While Article 52(1) of the 
Charter provides an exception to the protection of rights enshrined by the document where such 
an exception is necessary and genuinely meets an objective of general interest, the court found 
that those conditions were unmet.11 Although, the case left unclear whether then-current Member 
State data retention programs were generally legal, leaving some lack of clarity.12 
The decision established groundwork that reveals what factors can be relevant in such 
cases, including legislative clarity of circumstances in which the program applies, strict necessity 
in relation to the pursued interest, and procedural safeguards.  The court made clear that in 
context of what constitutes a proper general interest, crime and terror prevention are 
encompassed in this category and are viably advanced through the use of data retention.13 It 
further concluded that the EU legislature, when establishing such security measures, must make 
clear the rules “governing the scope and application of the measure.”14 In other words, the 
legislation that establishes the program must be such that the operations of the program are 
                                                 
10 “The EU General Data Protection Regulation,” Human Rights Watch, June 6, 2018, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/06/eu-general-data-protection-regulation  
11 Charter of Rights, art. 52(1) 
12 Bradley-Schmieg, Phil and Jones, Joseph, “CJEU Confirms that National Data-Retention Law May Only Be 
Adopted Where ‘Strictly Necessary,’” Inside Privacy, Covington & Burling, January 6, 2017,  
https://www.insideprivacy.com/international/european-union/cjeu-confirms-that-national-data-retention-laws-may-
only-be-adopted-where-strictly-necessary/  
13 Digital Rights Ireland and Others, cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April 
2014, sec. 51, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0293&from=en  
14 Ibid, sec. 54 
generally foreseeable. When such programs are implemented and derogations from the Charter’s 
privacy rights constraints are sought, these derogations “must apply only in so far as is strictly 
necessary.”15 The court found that strict necessity was not met because the EU program was 
functionally indiscriminate in whose data was retained.16 Furthermore, there were no objective 
limits outlining when national authorities could access the data.17  
Schrems – October 2015 
The October 2015 decision in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner is important to 
note as a particularly bold move by the court. It determined that the United States’ protections 
for personal data were inadequate under Charter requirements.18 Specifically, it looked at a 
certain data transfer scheme and determined that as data of EU citizens reached the US, the US 
could “process it in a way incompatible, in particular, with the purposes for which it was 
transferred, beyond what was strictly necessary and proportionate to the protection of national 
security.”19 The court thus demanded that the data transfer in this case be halted and transferring 
EU citizen data across the Atlantic to the U.S. was found to be inconsistent with EU law. There 
are two factors that make this important. First, it struck down a Decision by the European 
Commission called Safe Harbour which had initially determined that US safeguards were 
sufficient under EU standards.20 Furthermore, it was a ruling which implicated US and EU 
                                                 
15 Ibid, sec. 52 
16 Ibid, sec. 58 
17 Ibid, sec. 60 
18 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, case C-362/14, Court of Justice in the European Union, 6 October 
2015, sec. 24-26, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362&from=EN  
19 “The Court of Justice declares that the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision is invalid,” Press Release No 
117/5, Court of Justice of the European Union, 6 October, 2015, 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf  
20 “Max Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (CJEU - "Safe Harbor"),” Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, https://epic.org/privacy/intl/schrems/  
commercial and political interests. The point here is that the CJEU has been doing more than 
paying lip service to digital privacy rights and is willing to take on serious cases.  
Tele2 and Others - December 2016 
The ambiguities left by Digital Rights Ireland were in part resolved by the combined 
cases of Tele2 and Others. The decision clarified that Member State data retention and 
surveillance programs could be valid but refined the necessary conditions. Reaffirming Digital 
Rights Ireland, the court ruled that data retention programs are valid only if “strictly necessary” 
for accomplishing the relevant security interests.21 It further confirmed that only “serious crime” 
could possibly justify such programs.22 The implication of these two requirements, beyond 
prohibiting generalized, indiscriminate data retention, is that there must be some identifiable 
connection between the individual whose data is retained and the prevention of serious crime.23 
In order to ensure that these conditions are satisfied when national law enforcement authorities 
seek retained data, the court demands “that access of the competent national authorities to 
retained data should, as a general rule, except in cases of validly established urgency, be subject 
to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body.”24 The 
court also established the requirement that the individual whose data is utilized be notified 
“under the applicable national procedures, as soon as that notification is no longer liable to 
jeopardise the investigations being undertaken by those authorities.”25  
European Court of Human Rights 
Zakharov – December 2015 
 
                                                 
21 Tele2 and Others, cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Court of Justice in the European Union, 21 December, 2016, sec. 
96, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=186492&doclang=en 
22 Ibid, sec. 102 
23 Ibid, sec. 106-111 
24 Ibid, sec. 120 
25 Case of Roman Zakharov v. Russia, no. 47143/06, European Court of Human Rights, 4 December 2015, sec. 121, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159324 
Similar cases have come up in the ECHR, with the 2015 Case of Roman Zakharov v. 
Russia decision serving as the leading Grand Chamber opinion. Critically, the court established a 
requirement similar to that of the Tele2: that verifiable, individualized reasonable suspicion is 
required in instances of surveillance.26 This was an important development following decisions 
in Weber and Savaria v. Germany, where the Third Section viewed the transfer of data to law 
enforcement agencies absent suspicion as problematic, and Liberty and Ors v. United Kingdom 
where the Fourth Section did not address the issue.27 
Specifically, the court outlines that a surveillance-authorizing actor “must be capable of 
verifying the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned.”28 Throughout 
the opinion, the court is fundamentally concerned with blocking surveillance mechanisms which 
are amenable to potentially arbitrary and abusive use.29 Indeed, the authorizing agencies “must 
also ascertain whether the requested interception meets the requirement of ‘necessity in a 
democratic society’, as provided by Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, including whether it is 
proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, by verifying, for example whether it is possible to 
achieve the aims by less restrictive means.” This language is similar to that which is used by the 
CJEU.  
In another move that resembles the CJEU’s case law, the Zakharov court notes that one 
way to limit the concerns about arbitrariness is through judicial authorization of interception 
beforehand, the requirement of ex-post notice, and that the implementation of the surveillance 
program be foreseeable.30 In Zakharov, though there was judicial authorization, the court was not 
                                                 
26 Ibid, sec. 260 
27 Nyst, Carly, “European Human Rights Court Deals a Heavy Blow to the Lawfulness of Bulk Surveillance,” Just 
Security, December 9, 2015, https://www.justsecurity.org/28216/echr-deals-heavy-blow-lawfulness-bulk-
surveillance/  
28 Case of Roman Zakharov, sec. 260 
29 Ibid, sec. 302 
30 Ibid, sec. 228, 234, 267 
satisfied with its capacity to confirm reasonable suspicion due to other procedural 
irregularities.31 The court also notes that “the national law must define the scope of application 
of secret surveillance measures by giving citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances 
in which public authorities are empowered to resort to such measures.”32 This court also 
determined, as the Tele2 court did, that in order for the surveillance program to operate in a way 
that respects rule of law principles, notifying the citizen being surveilled at a reasonable point is 
critical as it provides an opportunity to seek legal remedy.33 Furthermore, the court also 
established that the law permitting surveillance must “be foreseeable as to its effects” thus 
implicating the clarity with which the law’s details must be made public.34 
Szabo – January 2016 
The Fourth Section court reiterated these expectations in the Case of Szabo and Vissy v. 
Hungary, where it also shed more light on what “necessary” and “proportionate” mean. 35 There 
the court held that a Hungarian anti-terror law did not abide by the Convention’s Article 8 
privacy protections. The opinion explains that, in secret surveillance cases, not only must the 
given legislative mechanism be “necessary in a democratic society,”36 but, referencing Digital 
Rights Ireland, that it also pass the “strict necessity” test.37 The court develops here a two-prong 
test: the surveillance must be “strictly necessary” for the “general consideration” of 
“safeguarding the democratic institutions” and “as a particular consideration, for the obtaining of 
vital intelligence in an individual operation.”38 So the court in this case reaffirms the Zakharov 
                                                 
31 Ibid, sec. 260-267 
32 Ibid, sec. 243 
33 Ibid, sec. 234 
34 Ibid, sec. 228 
35 Case of Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary, no. 37138/14, European Court of Human Rights, 12 January 2016, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=001-160020  
36 Ibid, sec. 59 
37 Ibid, sec. 72-73 
38 Ibid, sec. 73 
requirement of individualized, reasonable suspicion. Given that the Hungarian law did not 
require the national agency, “to produce supportive materials, or, in particular, a sufficient 
factual basis” then there is no way it could have been able to assess the “necessity of the 
proposed measure.”39 Indeed, “[f]or the Court, only such information would allow the 
authorizing authority to perform an appropriate proportionality test.”40  
The Szabo court also affirmed that judicial authorization based on sufficient facts is 
probably the clearest way to ensure compliance with the requirements outlined above.41 
Referencing the Zakharov decision, the court noted the lack of judicial authorization in the 
Hungarian muss surveillance system and determined that such oversight “would serve to limit 
the law enforcement authorities’ discretion.”42 Nonetheless, though it recognized that in some 
instances sufficiently-independent non-judicial bodies may be capable of lawful authorizations, 
the court indicated a clear preference for judicial authorization: “judicial control offering the best 
guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure…Accordingly, in this field, 
control by an independent body, normally a judge with special expertise, should be the rule and 
substitute solutions the exception, warranting close scrutiny.”43 Thus, either judicial 
authorization or an authorizing body independent of the executive appeared essential to the court.  
Centrum for Rattvisa – June 2018  
In Centrum for Rattvisa, the court largely applied the approaches developed in Zakharov 
in finding a Swedish surveillance system to be adequate. However, the case is notable in that the 
court gave particular attention to the broad discretion provided to states in fighting terrorism and 
                                                 
39 Ibid, sec. 71 
40 Ibid 
41 Nyst, Carly, “The European Court of Human Rights Constrains Mass Surveillance (Again), Just Security, January 
22, 2016, https://www.justsecurity.org/28939/ecthr-constrains-mass-surveillance/  
42 Case of Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary , sec. 73 
43 Ibid, sec. 77 
cross-border crime.44 Recognizing “present-day threats…as well as the increased sophistication 
of communications technology,” the court explained that states have wide discretion in 
determining what sort of security regimes they wish to implement.45 Although, of course, the 
operation of such regimes is limited by the above reasoning to that which is “necessary in a 
democratic society.”46 This decision is important to note as an indication of the general 
deference the court may give to states as it relates to these programs, as well as a confirmation 
that the appropriateness of a given system relates to the contemporary status of global security.  
Big Brother Watch – September 2018 
This recognition of a wider scope of state discretion in determining the necessity of a 
surveillance program becomes particularly poignant in the Case of Big Brother Watch and 
Others v. United Kingdom. The First Section determined that, while there was no judicial 
authorization nor was the authorizing body independent of the executive, certain substantive 
processes used in authorization passed the court’s scrutiny. While the court here reiterated that 
judicial authorization is “highly desirable,”47 it also appeared to depart from a clear rule and 
adopt a standard which looks to the potential for abuse.48 In this case, “pre-authorization scrutiny 
of warrant applications” and “extensive post-authorization scrutiny,” could be sufficient.49 But, 
as will be addressed below, the issue with any standard is that future application by courts is 
made more unpredictable.  
                                                 
44  Case of Centrum For Rattvisa v. Sweden, sec. 197 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid, sec. 180-81 
47 Case of Big Brother Watch and Others v. United Kingdom, nos. 58170/12, 62322/14 and 24960/15, European 
Court of Human Rights, 13 September 2018 (referral to Grand Chamber 04 February 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-186048  
48 Christakis, Theodore, “A Fragmentation of EU/ECHR Law on Mass Surveillance: Initial Thoughts on the Big 
Brother Watch Judgement,” European Law Blog, September 20, 2018, http://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/09/20/a-
fragmentation-of-eu-echr-law-on-mass-surveillance-initial-thoughts-on-the-big-brother-watch-judgment/  
49 Case of Big Brother Watch and Others v. United Kingdom, sec. 381 
 Comparing the Case Law 
 It does seem that in critical respects, the CJEU and the ECHR align in their approach to 
mass surveillance programs as they relate to privacy rights. Both require the adoption of 
safeguards which are meant to act as checks against potential agency abuse. Both have 
previously recognized the need for individualized suspicion insofar as there ought to be a 
relationship between an investigation and the particular data being obtained or held. The courts 
also indicate a strong preference for ex-post notification of surveillance and clear laws that 
provide for foreseeable implementation. 
 Although, there appears to be is less alignment following Big Brother Watch. There, the 
ECHR indicates that ex-post notification of the surveilled subject is no longer a requirement, 
given the nature of bulk surveillance.50 Similarly, the court reaffirmed the security value of bulk 
surveillance, seemingly shying away from concerns about the unpredictability inherent in such 
surveillance programs.51 Additionally, it seemed to move away from the requirement that there 
be prior authorization by a court or independent body of the data gathering, although that was a 
critical component of the Zakharov and Vissy decisions.52 Thus, the court in Big Brother Watch 
appeared  to loosen some of the legal expectations in the context of mass surveillance.53 
 While Big Brother Watch was lauded as a success amongst privacy rights advocates, 
given that the end result was favorable to their cause,54 the shift to more of a standard with 
respect to procedural checks introduces some instability to the ECHR regime. Standards are of 
course notoriously slippery and can more readily produce inconsistencies in the case law. In this 
                                                 
50 Ibid, sec. 317 
51 Ibid, sec. 384-86 
52 Christakis, “A Fragmentation of EU/ECHR Law on Mass Surveillance” 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
instance, it seems that “substance prevails over form.”55 Thus it is not entirely clear where the 
ECHR law stands, and it will have to be seen whether the CJEU follows suit.  
While this is a body of law that will continue to shift in important ways, especially as 
geopolitical concerns over terrorism do, the Big Brother Watch decision indicates that it is the 
CJEU which may be more committed to the rules that have been laid down. This is consistent 
with the foundational documents protecting individual rights that each court interprets. The 
Convention, which is interpreted by the ECHR, has an article devoted to a general privacy 
right.56 The Charter, which is within the purview of the CJEU, goes further, however, and 
instantiates protections for personal digital data specifically.57 Admittedly, the substantive 
difference this implies may not be major insofar as the Convention is an older document by 
about five decades, before digital concerns were salient. There is of course no doubt that the 
ECHR recognizes the right to the protection of digital data as an extension of the broader privacy 
rights. Nonetheless, the explicit nature of the Charter on this point may lend itself more to the 
development of clear rules by the CJEU. 
 Another explanation might be that the CJEU is responsive to, or at least structurally 
related to, as an institutional matter, the European Parliament which has over recent years taken 
serious steps to increase the strength of data privacy protection. The most obvious example of 
this is the passing of the GDPR. The Council of Europe does not have an equivalent political 
body which might influence the ECHR. 
On-going Cases and Implications 
                                                 
55 Ibid  
56 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8  
57 Charter of Rights, art. 7-8 
As cited by Privacy International in a brief in a current case ongoing against the French 
Data Network in the CJEU, the three CJEU cases considered above form the nexus of case law 
which determines the CJEU’s requirements with respect to the protections of citizen data and 
thus should be looked to in making decisions.58 In addition to this case, there is another filed 
regarding the United Kingdom; both are likely to test the court’s commitment to the conditions 
developed in Tele2. The United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal has filed for a 
preliminary ruling, asking for a clearer description of how the Tele2 requirements play out in the 
context of what they call the “essential necessity” of their bulk surveillance program.59 It noted 
that a domestic national court had determined the requirements “would frustrate the measures 
taken to safeguard national security by the [Security and Intelligence Agencies], and thereby put 
the national security of the United Kingdom at risk.”60 Thus the question is poignant: how might 
the requirements hold up when there is already a determination that they will impede national 
security? 
Given that the ECHR has recently indicated deference in Centrum for Rattvisa and Big 
Brother Watch to state agencies regarding how they determine their systems, this would be a 
particularly important ruling by the CJEU. The question has been put sharply as the Tribunal 
phrases it in a way that precisely pits the security concerns, which are supposed to be in the 
purview of individual states, against the safeguards which European courts are requiring. Given 
                                                 
58 Brief Filed By Privacy International, Court of Justice of the European Union, cases nos. C-511/18 and C-512/18, 
page 3, https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2019-
01/French_data_retention_PI_submission_to_the%20CJEU_english_translation.pdf  
59 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal - London (United Kingdom) made on 





that considerations of national security exert significant influence, the CJEU would likely have to 
rather directly repudiate the Tele2 requirements if it were to rule in the U.K.’s favor. 
Conclusion 
While the CJEU and the ECHR had been relatively consistent in what they have required 
of state surveillance programs as it relates to privacy rights, the Big Brother Watch case may 
have changed that. The cases that come in the next few years will be essential in establishing 
where the law stands. But, given that the case law is starting to become robust on this topic, as 
courts work out where they stand, it is likely to inform how GDPR Article 23(1) issues would be 
adjudicated.  
 
 
